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The proofs for Propositions 1 and 2 are omitted. §A provides the equivalent formulation to the
stage 1 optimization problem. The optimal processing decision 푧∗ is relegated to §B. §C illustrates
the proof for Proposition 3. The proofs for technical statements in the general “window contracts”
model and the beef market model (as summarized in Table 3) are provided in §D and §E, respectively.
A Characterization of Stage 1 Optimization Problem
Proposition A.1 The stage 1 optimization problem in (1) can be restated as Π(푄퐶 ;푃푆 , 흃) =
max0≤푧≤퐾 Λ(푧) where Λ(.) is continuous and strictly concave in 푧. We have
Λ(푧) =
⎧⎨⎩
Λ1,퐶(푧) for 0 ≤ 푧 ≤ min(퐼(푀), 푄퐶 ,퐾)
Λ2,퐶(푧) for min(퐼(푀), 푄퐶 ,퐾) < 푧 ≤ min(푄퐶 ,퐾)









Λ3,퐶(푧) for 0 ≤ 푧 ≤ min(퐼퐼,푄퐶 ,퐾)
Λ2,퐶(푧) for min(퐼퐼,푄퐶 ,퐾) < 푧 ≤ min(푄퐶 ,퐾)





< 푧 ≤ 퐾,
(10)
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for 휉1 ≥ 휉2 and for 휉1 < 휉2, respectively, where
Λ푘,퐶(푧) = −푄퐶 [max (min(푢, 푃푆 + 휈), 푢)]+ (1− 휔)푃푆 [푄퐶 − 푧]− 푐0푧 − 푐1(퐾 − 푧)2 + 휋푘(푎퐶1 푧, 푎퐶2 푧, 흃),
Λ푘,푆(푧) = −푄퐶 [max (min(푢, 푃푆 + 휈), 푢)]− (푧 −푄퐶)(푃푆 + 푡)− 푐0푧 − 훿(푧 −푄퐶)− 푐1(퐾 − 푧)2
+휋푘
(
(푎퐶1 − 푎푆1 )푄퐶 + 푎푆1 푧, (푎퐶2 − 푎푆2 )푄퐶 + 푎푆2 푧, 흃
)
,
for 푘 ∈ {1, 2, 3} and 퐼(푗) .=
휉1−휉2
2 −푄퐶 [(푏1−푒)(푎퐶1 −푎푗1)+(푏2−푒)(푎푗2−푎퐶2 )]
(푏1−푒)푎푗1−(푏2−푒)푎푗2
for 푗 ∈ {퐶, 푆} and 퐼퐼 .= 휉2−휉12(푏2−푒)푠 .
B Characterization of The Optimal Processing Decision 푧∗
Proposition B.1 For 휉1 ≥ 휉2 (휉1 < 휉2), there exist 8 spot price thresholds 푃 (.) (푃 (.)) that charac-








2 + 2푐1퐾 − 푐0 − 훼푠휇푆










2 + 2푐1퐾 − 푐0 − 훼푠휇푆













































= (1− 훼푠)−1 [휉1푎푆1 + 휉2푎푆2 + 2푐1퐾 − 푐0 − 푡− 훿 − 훼푠휇푆
−2푄퐶 [(푎퐶1 − 푎푆1 )(푏1푎푆1 + 푒푎푆2 ) + (푎퐶2 − 푎푆2 )(푏2푎푆2 + 푒푎푆1 )]







= (1− 훼푠)−1 [휉1푎푆1 + 휉2푎푆2 + 2푐1퐾 − 푐0 − 푡− 훿 − 훼푠휇푆
−2푄퐶 [(푎퐶1 − 푎푆1 )(푏1푎푆1 + 푒푎푆2 ) + (푎퐶2 − 푎푆2 )(푏2푎푆2 + 푒푎푆1 )]









[휉1(푏2 − 푒) + 휉2(푏1 − 푒)] 푠















[휉1(푏2 − 푒) + 휉2(푏1 − 푒)] 푠
푏1 + 푏2 − 2푒 − 푐0 − 푡− 훿 − 훼푠휇푆 − 2
[
(푏1푏2 − 푒2)푠2








휉2푠+ 2푐1퐾 − 푐0 − 훼푠휇푆













































[휉1(푏2 − 푒) + 휉2(푏1 − 푒)] 푠


















(푦) (푃 푘(푦)), for 푘 ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, the argument 푦 refers to the last term in the
deﬁnition of the thresholds on the right-hand side.
For 흃 ∈ Ω1, the unique optimal processing decision 푧∗ is characterized by
푧∗ =
⎧⎨⎩
0 if 푃푆 ≥ 푃 0
푧∗1,퐶 =
(1−휔−훼푠)(푃 0−푃푆)
2[푏1(푎퐶1 )2+푏2(푎퐶2 )2+2푒푎퐶1 푎퐶2 +푐1]
if 푃
0
> 푃푆 ≥ 푃 1(min(푄퐶 ,퐾))
min(푄퐶 ,퐾) if 푃
1
(min(푄퐶 ,퐾)) > 푃푆 ≥ 푃 4(min(푄퐶 ,퐾))
푧∗1,푆 = min(푄
퐶 ,퐾) + (푃
4
(min(푄퐶 ,퐾))−푃푆)(1−훼푠)
2[푏1(푎푆1 )2+푏2(푎푆2 )2+2푒푎푆1 푎푆2 +푐1]
if 푃
4




For 흃 ∈ Ω2, the unique optimal processing decision 푧∗ is characterized by
푧∗ =
⎧⎨⎩
0 if 푃푆 ≥ 푃 0
푧∗1,퐶 =
(1−휔−훼푠)(푃 0−푃푆)
2[푏1(푎퐶1 )2+푏2(푎퐶2 )2+2푒푎퐶1 푎퐶2 +푐1]
if 푃
0
> 푃푆 ≥ 푃 1(푄퐶)
푄퐶 if 푃
1





2[푏1(푎푆1 )2+푏2(푎푆2 )2+2푒푎푆1 푎푆2 +푐1]
if 푃
4
(푄퐶) > 푃푆 ≥ 푃 5(퐼(푆))













For 흃 ∈ Ω3, the unique optimal processing decision 푧∗ is characterized by
푧∗ =
⎧⎨⎩
0 if 푃푆 ≥ 푃 0
푧∗1,퐶 =
(1−휔−훼푠)(푃 0−푃푆)
2[푏1(푎퐶1 )2+푏2(푎퐶2 )2+2푒푎퐶1 푎퐶2 +푐1]
if 푃
0
> 푃푆 ≥ 푃 1(퐼(푀))






] if 푃 1(퐼(푀)) = 푃 2(퐼(푀)) > 푃푆 ≥ 푃 3(min(푄퐶 ,퐾))
min(푄퐶 ,퐾) if 푃
3
(min(푄퐶 ,퐾)) > 푃푆 ≥ 푃 6(min(푄퐶 ,퐾))
푧∗2,푆 = min(푄











For 흃 ∈ Ω4, the unique optimal processing decision 푧∗ is characterized by
푧∗ =
⎧⎨⎩




if 푃 0 > 푃푆 ≥ 푃 1(퐼퐼)






] if 푃 1(퐼퐼) = 푃 2(퐼퐼) > 푃푆 ≥ 푃 3(min(푄퐶 ,퐾))
min(푄퐶 ,퐾) if 푃 3(min(푄퐶 ,퐾)) > 푃푆 ≥ 푃 6(min(푄퐶 ,퐾))
푧∗2,푆 = min(푄






] if 푃 6(min(푄퐶 ,퐾)) > 푃푆 ≥ 푃 7
퐾 if 푃 7 > 푃푆.
For 흃 ∈ Ω5, the unique optimal processing decision 푧∗ is characterized by
푧∗ =
⎧⎨⎩




if 푃 0 > 푃푆 ≥ 푃 1(푄퐶)





if 푃 4(푄퐶) > 푃푆 ≥ 푃 5(퐼퐼)






] if 푃 5(퐼퐼) = 푃 6(퐼퐼) > 푃푆 ≥ 푃 7
퐾 if 푃 7 > 푃푆.
For 흃 ∈ Ω6, the unique optimal processing decision 푧∗ is characterized by
푧∗ =
⎧⎨⎩




if 푃 0 > 푃푆 ≥ 푃 1(min(푄퐶 ,퐾))
min(푄퐶 ,퐾) if 푃 1(min(푄퐶 ,퐾)) > 푃푆 ≥ 푃 4(min(푄퐶 ,퐾))
푧∗3,푆 = min(푄
퐶 ,퐾) + (푃
4(min(푄퐶 ,퐾))−푃푆)(1−훼푠)
2[푏2푠2+푐1]
if 푃 4(min(푄퐶 ,퐾)) > 푃푆 ≥ 푃 5(퐾)
퐾 if 푃 5(퐾) > 푃푆.
C Characterization of the First-Order Condition at Stage 0
Proof of Proposition 3: Using Proposition B.1, we can characterize the expected proﬁt 피[Π(푄퐶)]
for 푄퐶 ≤ 퐾 and 푄퐶 > 퐾. Let 푓(휉˜1, 휉˜2) denote the density function of 흃˜′ = (휉˜1, 휉˜2). We deﬁne
Π푘(푄퐶 , 흃˜) for 푘 = 1, .., 6 such that 피[Π(푄퐶)] =
∑6
푘=1 피[Π푘(푄퐶 , 흃˜)∣흃˜ ∈ Ω푘]푃푟{흃˜ ∈ Ω푘}. For
36
example, for 푄퐶 ≤ 퐾, we have Π1(푄퐶 , 흃˜) = ∫∞
푃



















Λ1,푆(퐾) 푑퐹 (푃˜푆). Π푘(푄퐶 , 흃˜) for
the other regions can be established in the same manner, and is omitted. For 푄퐶 > 퐾, we have







min(푢, 푃˜푆 + 휈), 푙
)]
+ 피[푃˜푆(1− 휔)] < 0 (11)
by assumption. For 푄퐶 ≤ 퐾, we analyze each ∂Π푘
∂푄퐶
separately. We only provide the characterization




























2 + Δ(휉˜1 − 휉˜2) + 2푐1퐾 − 푐0 + 훼푠(푃˜푆 − 휇푆)









푃˜푆 + 푡+ 훿 + Δ[휉˜1 − 휉˜2]− 2푄퐶(Δ)2[푏1 + 푏2 − 2푒]− Δ[(푏1 − 푒)푎
푆
1 − (푏2 − 푒)푎푆2 ]
[푏1(푎푆1 )
2 + 푏2(푎푆2 )














푃˜푆 + 푡+ 훿 + Δ[휉˜1 − 휉˜2]− 2푄퐶(Δ)2[푏1 + 푏2 − 2푒]− 2Δ퐾[(푏1 − 푒)푎푆1 − (푏2 − 푒)푎푆2 ]
]
푑퐹 (푃˜푆)











From (11), we have ∂
2피[Π(푄퐶)]
∂(푄퐶)2
= 0; hence 피[Π(푄퐶)] is concave for 푄퐶 > 퐾. For 푄퐶 < 퐾, for con-
cavity, it is suﬃcient to prove that ∂
2Π푘(푄퐶)
∂(푄퐶)2
















(푏1푏2 − 푒2)(푎푆1 + 푎푆2 )2 + (푏1 + 푏2 − 2푒)푐1
푏1(푎푆1 )
2 + 푏2(푎푆2 )







−2(Δ)2(푏1+푏2−2푒)푑퐹 (푃˜푆) < 0.
The other regions can be established in the same manner, and the proof is omitted. Combining all
Ω푘, we have ∂
2피[Π(푄퐶)]
∂(푄퐶)2
< 0 for 푄퐶 < 퐾; hence 피[Π(푄퐶)] is also concave for 푄퐶 < 퐾. It is easy to
establish that 피[Π(푄퐶)] is kinked at 푄퐶 = 퐾. Therefore it is not diﬀerentiable at 푄퐶 = 퐾. It is










. Therefore 피[Π(푄퐶)] is globally concave.
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and 푧∗(.), for 푄







min(푢, 푃˜푆 + 휈), 푙
)]
(12)


































































(푃 6(푄퐶)− 푃˜푆)(1− 훼푠)
]
푑퐹 (푃˜푆)










(푃 4(푄퐶)− 푃˜푆)(1− 훼푠)
]
푑퐹 (푃˜푆)







where ℎ = (푏1− 푒)푎푆1 − (푏2− 푒)푎푆2 . From (11), we have ∂피[Π(푄
퐶)]
∂푄퐶
< 0 for 푄퐶 > 퐾; hence 푄퐶
∗ ≤ 퐾.
Since 피[Π(푄퐶)] is concave function, 푄퐶∗ = 0 if ∂피[Π(푄
퐶)]
∂푄퐶






is the solution to the ﬁrst order condition as depicted in (12).The equivalence between
(12) and the optimality condition in (4) can be obtained after standardizing 푃˜푆 as 휇푆 + 푧휎푆 , and
using the identities of the standard normal distribution.
D Proofs for the “Window Contracts” Model






Π푙(푄퐶 , 흃˜, 푃˜푆)
]∣∣∣ 흃˜ ∈ Ω푙]푃푟{흃˜ ∈ Ω푙}.






min(푢, 푃˜푆 + 휈), 푙
)]
. For a given 푄퐶 , we can separate 푉 (푄퐶) as follows:








퐶 , 흃˜, 푃˜푆)
]∣∣∣ 흃˜ ∈ Ω푙]푃푟{흃˜ ∈ Ω푙} (13)
where the ﬁrst term is the expected contract procurement cost, the second term is the expected rev-
enues from spot sales, and the remaining terms denote the additional expected proﬁt from processing
38















2 + Δ(휉1 − 휉2) + 2푐1퐾 − 푐0 − 훼푠휇푆 − 푃˜푆(1− 휙− 훼푠)]2
4[푏1(푎푆1 )
2 + 푏2(푎푆2 )
2 + 2푒푎푆1 푎
푆
2 + 푐1 + (Δ)
2









−푃˜푆(1− 휔)푄퐶 − 푐1퐾2 +푄퐶 [휉1푎푆1 + 휉2푎푆2 + Δ(휉1 − 휉2) + 2푐1퐾 − 푐0 + 훼푠(푃˜푆 − 휇푆)]















2 + 2푐1퐾 − 푐0 − 훼푠휇푆 − 푃˜푆(1− 훼푠)− 푡− 훿 − 2Δ푄퐶 [(푏1 − 푒)푎푆1 − (푏2 − 푒)푎푆2 ]]2
4[푏1(푎푆1 )
2 + 푏2(푎푆2 )














2 − 푐0 − 훼푠휇푆 − 푃˜푆(1− 훼푠)− 푡− 훿 − 2Δ푄퐶 [(푏1 − 푒)푎푆1 − (푏2 − 푒)푎푆2 ]]
−퐾2[푏1(푎푆1 )2 + 푏2(푎푆2 )2 + 2푒푎푆1 푎푆2 ]
]
푑퐹 (푃˜푆).
피푃˜푆 [Π1Θ] for the other Ω푙 regions can be characterized in a similar fashion. By using the normal-















푧Φ(푧) + 휙(푧) is the standard normal loss function, and Φ(.) and 휙(.) is cdf and pdf of standard
normal random variable, respectively. Using the identity 휙
′











. It follows that ∂퐺(푙,푢)∂휎푆 > (<)0 if 휇푆 + 휈 <
푙+푢





= 0 if 휇푆 + 휈 =
푙+푢
2 or 푙 = 푢 or 푙→ −∞, 푢→∞.








퐶 , 흃˜, 푃˜푆)







퐶 , 흃˜, 푃˜푆)
∣∣∣ 흃˜ ∈ Ω푙]푃푟{흃˜ ∈ Ω푙}]
Let 피푃˜푆 [Ψ(푃˜푆)] denote the right-hand side term. We use the following result from Mu¨ller (2001):
Lemma D.1 Let 푃˜푆 (푃˜
푆
) to have a normal distribution with mean 휇푆 (휇푆) and standard deviation
휎푆 (휎푆). If 휇푆 = 휇푆 and 휎푆 ≤ 휎푆, then, 푃˜푆 ≤ 푃˜
푆
in the convex order, i.e. 피[푓(푃˜푆)] ≤ 피[푓(푃˜푆)]
for any convex function 푓 .
For convexity of Ψ(푃푆) in 푃푆 , it is suﬃcient to show that each Π푙Θ is a convex function of 푃
푆 . We
will only provide the proof for Ω1 region, i.e. Π1Θ. The same result for the other regions can be
39





0 if 푃푆 ∈ [푃 0,∞)





(훼푠+ 휔 − 1)푄퐶 if 푃푆 ∈ [푃 4(푄퐶), 푃 1(푄퐶))





휔푄퐶 − (1− 훼푠)퐾 if 푃푆 ∈ [0, 푃 5(퐾))
(14)













2 + 2푒푎푆1 푎
푆
2 + 푐1 + Δ













2 + 2푒푎푆1 푎
푆
2 + 푐1.
From (14), it can be easily established that Π1Θ is convexly decreasing in 푃










> 0 and the fact that Π1Θ is a smooth function of 푃
푆 , i.e. left-hand
side and right-hand side derivative at boundaries in (14) are equal. This concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 5: The correlation parameter 훼 only aﬀects the expected value of processing








[푠(푃˜ 푠 − 휇푆)푓1(푃˜
푆)
2ℎ1











[푠(푃˜ 푠 − 휇푆)푓2(푃˜
푆)
2ℎ2
] 푑퐹 (푃˜푆) +
∫ 푃 5(퐾)
0
[푠(푃˜ 푠 − 휇푆)퐾] 푑퐹 (푃˜푆)








= 푧∗1,푆 . Thus, using
Proposition B.1, (16) can be written as 피푃˜푆
[
푍∗(푃˜푆)푠(푃˜ 푠 − 휇푆)
]
where 푍∗ is the random vari-
able that denotes the optimal processing decision. Since 푃˜푆 is normally distributed, we have
피푃˜푆
[
푍∗(푃˜푆)푠(푃˜ 푠 − 휇푆)
]
= 푠휎푆피 [푍∗(휇푆 + 푧휎푆)푧] where the second expectation is taken over the
standard normal random variable. As follows from Stein’s Lemma, for a diﬀerentiable function 푔
and a standard normal random variable 푧, we have 피[푔(푧)푧] = 피[푔′(푧)] (see for example, Rubinstein
(1976)). By using this identity, we obtain














푑퐹 (푃˜푆) < 0
as 훼 < 1−휔푠 . The desired result follows as this argument also holds for the other Ω
(.) regions.
Proof of Proposition 6: As can be observed from (13), the comparison of 푉 (푄퐶) with window
contract and forward contract reduces to the comparison of the expected contract procurement cost
퐺(푙, 푢). We deﬁne 퐻(퐹 )
.
= 퐺(퐹 − 휏, 퐹 + 휏) − 퐹 as the cost diﬀerential between the window and
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< 0. By using
휙(푧) = 휙(−푧) and Φ(푧) = 1 − Φ(−푧) for the standard normal distribution, it is easy to establish
that 퐻(휇푆 + 휈) = 0. Therefore, if 퐹 > 휇푆 + 휈 (퐹 < 휇푆 + 휈), the expected cost of window contract
is higher (lower) than the forward contract. As follows from (12), the type of the contract only
aﬀects the expected marginal procurement cost 퐺(푙, 푢) of C-input in the optimality condition. Since
푉 (푄퐶) is a concave function of 푄퐶 , it follows that 푄퐶
∗
is lower (higher) with the window contract
if 퐹 > 휇푆 + 휈 (퐹 < 휇푆 + 휈). It is easy to establish that the expected spot procurement at the
optimal solution depends on the contract type only through the optimal volume of C-input, and is
decreasing in 푄퐶
∗
. This concludes the proof.
E Proofs for the Analytical Statements in Table 3
We only provide the proof for the impact of 휌휉 and 휎휉 on the expected proﬁt by using the assumption
that all the probability mass of 흃˜ is located in Ω1 region. The proof for the impact of 휎푆 follows
from Proposition 4, and the proof for 휇푆 and 휇푖 can be obtained using a similar technique. In
each of the proofs, we will demonstrate the impact on 푉 (푄퐶) for 푄퐶 < 퐾. This also implies






퐶 , 흃, 푃˜푆)
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Proof of 휌휉 eﬀect on 푉 (푄
퐶) : We use the following result result from Mu¨ller (2001):
Lemma E.1 Let 흃˜ (흃˜) to have a bivariate normal distribution with mean 흁 (흁) and covariance
matrix Σ (Σ). If 흁 = 흁, 흃˜ and 흃˜ have the same marginal distributions, Σ푖푗 ≤ Σ푖푗, then 흃˜ ≤ 흃˜ in
the supermodular order, i.e. 피[푓(흃˜)] ≤ 피[푓(흃˜)] for any supermodular function 푓 .
Since we have symmetric 휎휉, it follows from Lemma E.1 that increasing 휌휉 leads to another bivariate
normal distribution that is preferred over 흃˜ in the supermodular order. It is suﬃcient to show that
Υ(흃) is supermodular in 흃. To prove supermodularity, it is suﬃcient to show ∂
2Υ(흃)
∂휉1∂휉2





















푑퐹 (푃˜푆) > 0
where ℎ1 and ℎ2 are as deﬁned in (15). This concludes the proof.
Proof of 휎휉 eﬀect on 푉 (푄
퐶) : We use the following result result from Mu¨ller (2001):
Lemma E.2 Let 흃˜ (흃˜) to have a bivariate normal distribution with mean 흁 (흁) and covariance




= 휎휉). If 흁 = 흁, and 휎휉 ≤ 휎휉 then 흃˜ ≤ 흃˜ in the
convex order, i.e. 피[푓(흃˜)] ≤ 피[푓(흃˜)] for any convex function 푓 .




, it is suﬃciently show that Υ(흃) is jointly
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푑퐹 (푃˜푆) > 0























Hence, Υ(흃) is jointly convex in 흃. This concludes the proof.
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